



A New Hegemon in Russia’s Backyard? 
Assessing China’s Implementation of the Belt and 
Road Initiative in Kazakhstan. 
 
Abstract 
By assessing the implementation of China’s BRI in Kazakhstan, this article examines a 
potential threat posed by the BRI to Russian hegemony in Central Asia. Analysing the 
implications that the initiative incorporates for the regional power balances and by applying 
concepts of hegemony found in both neo-Gramscianism and neoliberal institutionalism, the 
authors argue that a considerable shift in regional hegemony is underway and that, as the BRI 
grows stronger, it could eventually lead to China gaining the ability of shaping ‘forms of state’ 
of Kazakhstan and becoming a hegemon, a development underlined by both theories. In the 
case of Kazakhstan, arguing along the dimensions of political economic as well as social shifts 
away from Russia and towards China, the article finds that China has increased its influence 
through the new institutions and norms provided by the initiative to such a degree that it fulfils 
the requirements for hegemony, which could possibly trigger a transition in the entire Central 
Asian region. 
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Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia’s aspiration to be a hegemon in Central Asia 
has for years been relatively successful since political economic, and cultural cohesion has tied 
Central Asian states to Russia (Buranelli, 2018). Today, Russia still plays a large economic and 
political role in many former Soviet states and in the largest and most economically developed 
Central Asian state, Kazakhstan (Buranelli, 2018; Kuhrt, 2018). With Kazakhstan’s wealth in 
natural resources, such as oil and gas, its relatively high level of development, and its strategic 
geographic position in Central Asia, the country is of great interest to Russia (Pepe, 2016). Yet, 
Kazakhstan has lately started to look towards China and has become one of China’s prime 
partners in Central Asia. This is evident by the fact that China’s President, Xi Jinping, first 
introduced the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI) in 2013 in Kazakhstan’s capital (Kassenova, 
2017). The former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, perceived the initiative as 
an opportunity to advance the country’s infrastructure and enhance trade relations between the 
two countries. 
  
As China has experienced rapid economic growth during the last 40 years, the Chinese 
government increasingly emphasises the importance of global market access (Mayer, 2018). 
The BRI, which aims at developing this global market access, will cost an estimated 800 billion 
USD and will mainly be funded by Chinese financial institutions, such as the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), making it the largest infrastructure and development 
project ever introduced. By 2017, 22 countries had already signed the BRI Memorandum of 
Understanding and therefore agreed to the establishment of the initiative, and the number of 
countries participating is increasing constantly (Alon et al., 2018). The BRI aims at creating 
cooperation on five critical connections: infrastructure construction, unimpeded trade, financial 
integration, policy coordination, and ‘people-to-people bond’ (State Council, 2015). The 
method of establishing said cooperation is to create new transportation routes inspired by the 
ancient Silk Road, which will consist of two parts, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road, going through Asia, Africa, and Europe (Mayer, 2018). The Silk 
Road Economic Belt includes six land routes, implementing the transportation and logistic 
framework needed for the BRI (Duval et al., 2017).  
 
For Russia, the initiative with all its possible economic and political implications could be seen 
as a worrying interference with the country’s role as a Central Asian hegemon, as the BRI will 
pass through Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, thereby developing the economic and 
 
 
political environments in the region in a direction beneficial to China (Peyrouse, 2017). To 
Russia, a Central Asia dominated by China is equally threatening as a Central Asia dominated 
by the West (Fels, 2018) despite the fact that China has formerly emphasised the importance 
of a peaceful international environment (Mayer, 2018). This article investigates why the 
implementation of the Chinese BRI in Kazakhstan could be perceived by Russia as posing a 
threat to Russian hegemonic power in Central Asia. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Applying Robert W. Cox’ theory on neo-Gramscian hegemony enables to present how the BRI 
and its implementation in Kazakhstan could be seen as a threat to Russian hegemony in the 
Central Asian region. Hegemony concerns more than simply political and economic power 
with Cox arguing that social and cultural aspects are crucial (Cox, 1981). Especially the 
reciprocal triangular relation between the ‘social forces’, ‘forms of state’, and ‘world orders’, 
which Cox argues for when raising the concept to an international level, provides a 
comprehensive theoretical framework to analyse the broader correlations that affect and enable 
hegemony. Hereby ‘social forces’ are seen as the organisation and processes of production, 
‘forms of state’ are derived from the relation between the state and the society, and the ‘world 
orders’ are seen as the configuration of the three forces of material power, ideas and 
institutions. Taking Russian hegemony over Kazakhstan into account, it is relevant to examine 
how the BRI might affect the social, economic, and inter-state relations between the countries 
and whether the initiative can make Kazakhstan follow Chinese interests and thereby threaten 
Russian hegemony. This is not to say that it is China’s goal to threaten Russian hegemony in 
the area, rather the neo-Gramscian theory is going to be used as a tool to see if this might be 
perceived as the consequence of the BRI.  
 
Further, to illustrate the ways in which Kazakhstan is changing its political economic 
orientation from focusing on regional economic and political institutions, shaped and promoted 
by Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and instead turning towards a globally-
aimed framework promoted by China today, Robert O. Keohane’s theory on neoliberal 
institutionalism is applied. Viewing these political and economic frameworks as international 
institutions created, moulded, and promoted by the self-interest of different states with different 
political and economic power levels (Keohane, 1984), the article seeks to analyse how the 
Chinese BRI can be perceived as posing a threat to Russian hegemony in Central Asia. To this 
end, the article discusses which consequences Kazakhstan’s shift towards a more globally 
 
 
aimed political economy may have for Central Asian power relations. However, in viewing the 
BRI as an institution capable of shifting current power relations in Central Asia, the application 
of neoliberal institutionalism does not propose that the initiative simply poses an economic and 
political zero-sum game in which a gain for China correlates to a loss for Russia. Rather, even 
though the initiative is seen as an institution created according to Chinese self-interest, it may 
create the possibility of Russian economic gains alongside China.  
 
Weakening Cooperation with Russia 
After the announcement of the BRI in 2013, Russia immediately proposed the establishment 
of a new regional trade union, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Zank, 2017), which can 
be seen as a reaction to China’s plans. The EAEU was meant to create a large, unified trade 
zone, implementing common tariffs and regional trade laws in Central Asia with Russia 
inviting 12 former Soviet Republics to join (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). Despite 
this Russian attempt to create a large economic area, only Kazakhstan and Belarus joined the 
EAEU as founding members. As Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have tied 
themselves closer to China through the BRI, which could lead to the decline of Russia’s 
economic influence on the former Soviet Republics, the EAEU could be seen as a Russian-led 
institution attempting to regain Russian hegemonic power over the Central Asian states (Zank, 
2017). This attempt seems to be failing, as several EAEU member states have criticised the 
union, and Kazakhstan in particular has reserved its right to withdraw its membership if the 
union does not bring about the expected results of opening up to global markets (Peyrouse, 
2017). 
 
The official Foreign Policy Concept for 2014-2020 of the Republic of Kazakhstan underlines 
Kazakhstan’s ambitions to take part in global markets by setting the goal of ‘(...) full-scale 
participation of the country in international and financial institutions (...)’ (Foreign Policy 
Concept, 2014) while protecting Kazakhstan’s self-interests. The continuation of strengthening 
the bilateral ties to the historically closest partner, Russia, is mentioned as the first regional 
priority in the document. Furthermore, the participation in the EAEU is mentioned. 
Furthermore, the document states the deepening of the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership 
with China’ as the second regional priority. Despite underlining the importance of dialogue 
regarding various topics, such as development of energy infrastructure and trade, the document 
does not mention the BRI by name (Foreign Policy Concept, 2014). Arguably, however, the 
implications of this policy, which suggests higher importance of keeping ties to Russia than 
 
 
taking part in the BRI, shifted to a reverse priority. Nazarbayev’s pro-China remarks regarding 
the BRI depict a shift in foreign policy priorities towards the Eastern neighbour, as the former 
president highlighted the strategic complementarity between the BRI and the Kazakhstani 
infrastructure programme ‘Nurly Zhol’. The eagerness to support the initiative derives from 
the willingness to consolidate the role of Kazakhstan as the economic bridge between East and 
West (Indeo, 2018). 
 
As Kazakhstan is increasingly leaning towards China, Russia might feel itself compelled to 
follow more assertive policies. Yet, following Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism (1984), 
Russian attempts at asserting dominance over Kazakhstan would generate serious discord in 
Central Asia, as Russia would impede on China’s goal of realising the BRI and improving its 
international trade. However, China’s possibility of being a new hegemon in Central Asia can 
also be seen as impeding on the Russian goal of maintaining a closely related Central Asia built 
on Russian ideals. Either way, Russia fighting the BRI with trade sanctions on China, would 
cause discord in Central Asia, which could potentially lead to a greater loss for Russia, 
economically and politically. Instead, it would be better for Russia to cooperate with China on 
the BRI, which is arguably why the initiative has received Russian support (Lee, 2019). 
 
Strengthening Cooperation with China 
The main foundation of the current cooperation between China and Kazakhstan is the common 
agreement regarding the implementation of the BRI. The initiative improves Chinese-
Kazakhstani trade relations, which have been established through joint ventures and Chinese 
foreign direct investments (FDI). These FDIs, which Kazakhstan has benefitted from for 
decades, and which mainly concern the oil fields of western Kazakhstan (Peyrouse, 2008), 
foster growth and have since the introduction of the BRI increased rapidly, making Kazakhstan 
China’s largest trade partner in Central Asia. The announcement of the BRI and the signing of 
the Joint Declaration on New Stage of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between the 
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan (hereafter Joint Declaration) in 
2015 happened at a crucial point in the Kazakhstani economic development, as Kazakhstan’s 
economic growth had slowed and placed the country in strong need for new trading partners 
and investors (Indeo, 2018). The Joint Declaration promised cooperation in the development 
of the energy sector, infrastructural construction, and the linkage of the Kazakhstani ‘Nurly 
Zhol’ development programme to the BRI, providing Kazakhstan with billions in FDIs as well 
as economic and technical support for infrastructure development. This Chinese-Kazakhstani 
 
 
programme’s costs accumulate to approximately 26 billion USD including infrastructural, 
financial and logistic optimisation (Kassenova, 2017; Joint Declaration, 2015). This is forging 
a closer alliance and relationship between the two countries. 
 
The ‘Nurly Zhol’ entails development of Kazakhstan’s infrastructure through various 
initiatives, which all contribute to three specific goals; increasing GDP by 15.7% compared to 
2014, creating 395,500 new jobs, and increasing the World Economic Forum ranking of quality 
of basic infrastructure, and in that way ensure economic growth and necessary anti-crisis 
measures (Nurly Zhol, 2015). Investing in this programme can help meet China’s needs for 
natural resources, as well as fast transportation to Europe, and make China a powerful 
geopolitical center of Central Asia. This would allow China to shape rules and regulations, 
thereby generating gains in terms of power positioning and economy. Cooperating with China 
is also favourable for Kazakhstan as becoming the link between the East and the West has been 
part of the Kazakhstani strategy since its independence (Kassenova, 2017). Because of China’s 
rapid economic growth, China serves as an inspiration for Kazakhstan, and the two countries 
often share opinions in international politics. Clearly then, with its economic growth, increasing 
market access, and outward investments, China has gained the ability to actively shape 
institutions. In the case of Kazakhstan, China thus, in Cox’s words, partakes in shaping the 
Kazakhstani form of state, as is evident from the close cooperation taking place between the 
BRI and the Nurly Zhol, which is significantly altering the internal political situation in 
Kazakhstan. 
 
From a neoliberal institutionalist viewpoint (Keohane, 1984), as China is the founder of the 
BRI, as well as the stronger state of this specific cooperation, it will have the largest influence 
on the creation of an international regime. Furthermore, China plays the main part in shaping 
rules, decision-making procedures, principles, and norms in the BRI, as well as the policy-
coordination according to its own self-interest. Therefore, both theories underline that as the 
BRI grows stronger, it could eventually lead to China gaining the ability of shaping ‘forms of 
state’ of Kazakhstan and becoming a hegemon. 
 
Kazakhstan’s Shift in Trade Relations  
Since gaining independence, Kazakhstan gradually integrated into international and regional 
trade organisations and was able to establish bilateral relations and strategic partnerships with 
various states, in and outside the former Soviet Union, while keeping the strategic economic 
 
 
ties to the hegemon, Russia. Kazakhstan transitioned from isolation in bilateral relations with 
Russia to nowadays being successfully integrated in global markets (Pepe, 2016). The 
establishment of the BRI gave new incentives to Kazakhstan to diversify its multi-vectoral 
foreign policy and weaken Russia’s influential power on its economy. This new institution is 
claiming an economic area, which Russia has tried to bind closely to itself, weakening Russia’s 
influence and reshaping the Central Asian regional ‘world order’ in the sense of Cox’ theory 
of hegemony (1983). Especially the construction of transportation routes to Kazakhstan’s 
Caspian Sea ports threatens Russia’s hegemony over the Central Asian economy as this will 
provide transportation infrastructure connecting Europe with China without passing Russian 
territory (Peyrouse, 2017). 
 
The Joint Declaration between Kazakhstan and China outlines their priorities of development 
(Joint Declaration, 2015). Particularly, trade and manufacturing will diminish Russia’s 
economic influence and facilitate Kazakhstan’s shift towards China through a set of policies. 
These policies will enhance and diversify the Chinese-Kazakhstani trade by increasing the 
share of high-tech goods and promote Kazakhstan’s rise in global value chains by developing 
chemical industries, enabling the country to export further developed goods (Kassenova, 2017). 
This diversification of Kazakhstan’s economy and the new incentives given to widen its trade 
with China, as well as Kazakhstan’s position along the BRI transportation routes, could allow 
Kazakhstan to produce a broader variety of goods and import from additional countries. As 
Russia’s imports from Kazakhstan mainly include crude resources and Russia’s exports to 
Kazakhstan mainly consist of final goods and refined resources, this poses a severe economic 
threat to Russia. Kazakhstan could possibly import less from Russia, while knowing that Russia 
will stay dependent on Kazakhstan exporting to Russia (Pepe, 2016).  
 
Since the 1990s, a decrease in the share of exports towards Russia and an increase to other 
countries indicate a strong trade diversification of Kazakhstan. Because the coordination of the 
BRI and the Nurly Zhol facilitates the realisation of Kazakhstan’s goals, cooperation with 
China is arguably in Kazakhstan’s self-interest. In 2001, Russia was still the main destination 
for Kazakhstani goods, while in 2007, China had overtaken Russia, as over 50% more in value 
was exported to Kazakhstan’s Eastern neighbour (UN Comrade, 2019). This diversification in 
trade partners arose from a variety of incentives given for Kazakhstan in the last decades to 
loosen its economic ties to Russia. The establishment of new institutions, unions, and 
 
 
initiatives, such as the BRI, helped the country to open up and profit from global trade (Pepe, 
2016) and attract FDIs (Indeo, 2018). 
 
Moving away from Russian Linguistics – Integrating Chinese Culture  
Cox (1983) argues that the emulation of a hegemon’s culture in peripheral states abroad is one 
of the pillars on which hegemonic power rests. Today, Kazakhstan has two official languages, 
Kazakh and Russian. Around 94% of the Kazakhstani population is fluent in Russian, whereas 
roughly 74% of the population is fluent in Kazakh (Chen, 2018). Furthermore, even well into 
the 2000s, Russian still remained the working language of the Kazakhstani government and 
many other official institutions within the state apparatus (Medvedev, 2007).  
 
In 2014, the Kazakhstani government called for development of greater English skills in the 
Kazakhstani society (Zhumzhumina, 2014) to foster greater integration into global education 
and financial systems. Linguistic shifts are also bringing Kazakhstan closer to China, as 
government officials have called on the Kazakhstani population to learn Chinese. As more 
Chinese companies are established in Kazakhstan, the Chinese language is becoming more 
attractive, and the number of Kazakhstanis learning Chinese has increased more than fivefold 
from 2006 to 2016 (Farchy, 2016). Furthermore, in 2017, the Kazakhstani government 
approved a transition from a Cyrillic script to the Latin alphabet (Illmer et al., 2017). If 
implemented completely, these linguistic changes will weaken Russia’s hegemonic ties 
considerably. 
 
To Nazarbayev, several Asian countries have provided strong models of modernisation that 
may prove more beneficial to Kazakhstan than Western models (President of Kazakhstan, 
2017), thereby outlining a certain attraction to and complementarity with the Chinese 
development model. For decades, China has defined various development and modernisation 
goals with the amendment ‘with Chinese characteristics’, holding traditional values high while 
adapting to the modern world (Link, 2015). As cultural hegemony in a neo-Gramscian sense is 
achieved when the hegemon’s interests and beliefs become aspects of future emulation abroad 
(Cox, 1983), the similarities in China’s typical modernisation scheme to the one Nazarbayev 
has pragmatically promoted imply that China is succeeding in spreading its ‘world order’ in 





Still, as part of the BRI, China has actively promoted exchange of culture and knowledge. With 
what is referred to as ‘people-to-people bond’, the Chinese government is attempting to 
establish scientific, medical, and cultural ties with the countries cooperating on the BRI (State 
Council, 2015). The measures implemented regarding cultural ties between China and 
Kazakhstan show in events such as the 2017 World Expo of Future Energy, a subject which 
Kazakhstan and China are cooperating on (Gong, 2017). The BRI, furthermore, proposes a 
framework for new cultural and academic exchanges on a global scale, and increasing academic 
exchange between Kazakhstan and China can be seen in both countries. Between 2013 and 
2017 more than 11,000 students from Kazakhstan studied in China, showing a constant increase 
(Gong, 2017). 
 
The ambitious implementation of the BRI can lead to Chinese hegemony in Central Asia as its 
‘people-to-people bond’ will affect the sphere of ‘social forces’. Moreover, the newly 
established institutions, such as the AIIB, and sets of norms related to the initiative influence 
the sphere of ‘world order’. The reciprocal relation between these spheres will further affect 
the ‘forms of state’ as on an international political level, the BRI with its connection with the 
‘Nurly Zhol’ has already influenced Kazakhstani policies, thus entailing all three spheres 
required for hegemony according to Cox (1983). Yet, this description of how these three 
international spheres affect each other is not the only way in which the spheres have a reciprocal 
triangular relation. These changes that the BRI may start in Kazakhstan’s domestic and 
international affairs, its economy, and its culture would possibly allow China to claim the 
hegemonic role from Russia. Moreover, the BRI can be understood as an institution in the sense 
of Keohane (1984), as it provides a new set of norms and rules, which countries taking part in 
the initiative have to adhere to, thus giving China the possibility to create an international 
regime, establishing its hegemonic position in Central Asia. To Keohane (1984), a final 
requirement for becoming a hegemon is the willingness to lead intergovernmental relations, a 
willingness which China shows by pushing through its BRI. The Action Plan (2015) verifies 
this willingness by putting a focus on Chinese-initiated intergovernmental cooperation to 








Conclusion: China on its Way to Hegemony? 
The implementation of the BRI in Kazakhstan can be perceived as a threat to Russian 
hegemonic power in Central Asia, because, on the one hand, Russia’s influence on Kazakhstani 
culture and political economy declined since the announcement of the initiative, and, on the 
other hand, China increased its influence through the new institutions and norms provided by 
the initiative to such a degree that it fulfils the requirements for hegemony, which could 
possibly trigger a transition in the entire Central Asian region. 
 
Even years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia still held hegemony over Central 
Asia. However, since the announcement of the BRI in 2013, Russia’s influence on Kazakhstani 
culture and political economy has been declining despite Russia’s attempt of a countermeasure 
to the BRI through the creation of the EAEU in 2014. With Russia no longer being the biggest 
importer of Kazakhstani goods, Kazakhstan is broadening its access to the global market, thus 
becoming less reliant on Russia. 
 
Further, with the BRI, China has increased its influence in Central Asia. Kazakhstan has 
strengthened its trade with China over the last decades, showing a rising mutual economic 
interest between the countries, enhanced by the Joint Declaration. The ‘Nurly Zhol’ has the 
goals of modernising Kazakhstan’s infrastructure in terms of education, logistics, industry, and 
energy. Pragmatically joining forces with China, thus, gives Kazakhstan the economic and 
institutional structure to fulfil these goals.  
 
New Kazakhstani policies show that the country is moving closer to China culturally. After the 
announcement of the BRI, Nazarbayev implemented various policies to strengthen the 
Kazakhstani identity with methods inspired by Chinese modernisation schemes. The BRI has 
actively promoted ‘people-to-people bond’ with educational exchange. Through these 
exchanges and due to the constantly increasing number of Chinese companies in Kazakhstan, 
the Chinese language has become more prevalent in Kazakhstani society. 
 
The close cooperation between a new possible hegemon and Central Asia’s most developed 
economy provides the possibility that the rest of Central Asia could follow Kazakhstan’s 
example and cooperate more with China, turning away from Russia in hope of experiencing 
the same development as Kazakhstan. As China is increasing its influence in a broad variety of 
fields, both political economic and cultural, it is most likely that the vigorous implementation 
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